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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "NO-CITATION" RULES
Salem M. Katsh and Alex V. Chachkes*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most federal appellate courts designate a large percentage
of their opinions "unpublished," stripping them of some, or
more often all, of their precedential value.' According to the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, seventy-eight
percent of federal appellate decisions in 1999 were placed into
this phantom zone.2 Moreover, over half of these federal courts
have promulgated rules prohibiting citation to and courtroom
discussion of their unpublished opinions.3 The courts adopt these
"no-citation" rules ostensibly to protect classes of litigants and
the courts themselves from being prejudiced by the fact that so
many opinions are unreported. These no-citation rules, however,
raise serious constitutional issues that the courts and
commentators have not adequately or squarely addressed.
* Copyright © 2001 Salem M. Katsh and Alex V. Chachkes. Mr. Katsh is a partner of
Shearman & Sterling and Chair of its Intellectual Property Group. Mr. Chachkes is an
associate and member of the Group. This article represents solely the views of the authors.
It does not represent the views, opinions or position of Shearman & Sterling.
1. See 1st Cir. R. 36 (2000); 2d Cir. R. 0.23 (1994); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.1-5.8 (2000); 4th
Cir. I.O.P. 36(a)-(c), 36.3 (1995); 5th Cir. R. 47.5 (1999); 6th Cir. R. 206, I.O.P. 206
(1998); 7th Cir. R. 53 (2000); 8th Cir. I.O.P. IV B, App. 1 (2000); 9th Cir. R. 36-1 to 36-6
(1995); 10th Cir. R. 36.1-36.3 (1999); 1 1th Cir. R. 36-1 to 36-3 (2000); D.C. Cir. R. 36
(2000); Fed. Cir. R. 47.6 (1999).
2. Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 1999 Annual Report of the Director
49, tbl. S-3 (available at <http://www.uscourts.gov/judbusl999/supps.html>).
3. See 1st Cir. R. 36(b)(1), 36(b)(2)(F) (2000); 2d Cir. R. 0.23 (2000); 3d Cir. l.O.P.
5.8 (2000); 7th Cir. R. 53(b)(2)(iv) (2000); 8th Cir. I.O.P. IV B (2000); 9th Cir. R. 36-3
(2000); Fed. Cir. R. 47.6(b) (2000). Some of these rules allow citation to unpublished cases
in related cases for purposes of establishing res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the
case.
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In Anastasoff v. United States,4 a panel of the court held
that the Eighth Circuit's rule allowing the discretionary
designation of opinions as "not for publication" and as
nonprecedential violated basic axioms as to the nature and limits
of the judicial power under Article III and therefore was
unconstitutional. We applaud the panel's pointed examination of
a practice that has largely escaped the constitutional scrutiny it
deserves.
However, we believe that the reasoning of the Eighth
Circuit panel's opinion does not necessarily provide the full or
even the correct explanation for the constitutional infirmities in
nonpublication rules and their attendant no-citation rules. We
note some of our reservations below.' This article, however, is
4. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc). This article was commenced prior to both of the Eighth Circuit's rulings in
Anastasoff.
5. Judge Richard S. Arnold's welcome and thoughtful opinion in Anastasoff is
critically dependent on the proposition that it is unconstitutional for one appellate court
panel to render a decision in conflict with that of a prior panel in the same court.
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904. There may be reason to question this holding. To be sure, all
of the circuits have stated that their panels are bound by the decisions of prior panels and
that past panel decisions can only be overruled en banc. See e.g. In re Jaylaw Drug, Inc.,
621 F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1980); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 91 (2000). This rule is sometimes called
the "law-of-the-circuit" rule or the "rule of interpanel accord." E.g. U.S. v. Burgos, 94
F.3d 849, 860 (4th Cir. 1996). Law-of-the-circuit rules make sense, of course, because
adherence to them reduces the potential for conflicting decisions within a particular circuit.
Until the Eighth Circuit panel's decision in Anastasoff, no circuit had granted its law-of-
the-circuit rule constitutional status. Cf LaShawn v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (holding that "the law-of-the-circuit doctrine is derived from legislation and from
the structure" of the circuit court system). It is unclear, at best, whether such rules can be
justified squarely on constitutional grounds. The judicial system established by Article III
has been designed to permit collateral courts to be in conflict: Circuit courts are not
regarded as bound by the decisions of other circuits, and district courts in a particular
circuit do not regard the decisions of other district judges in that (or any other circuit) as
binding. Convenience and prudence may dictate the law-of-the-circuit rule, but it may well
lack constitutional status. See U.S. v. Valencia, 669 F.2d 37, 37 (2d Cir. 1981)
(VanGraafeiland, J., dissenting) ("Although it is unusual for one panel to acknowledge that
it is overruling another, a panel may overturn precedent implicitly by simply ignoring it.")
(internal citations omitted). Moreover, at least one author has suggested that federal courts
can deny a case precedential value by virtue of their power in equity. Evan Schultz, Gone
Hunting: Judge Richard Arnold of the 8th Circuit Has Taken Aim at Unpublished
Opinions, but Missed His Mark, Leg. Times 78 (Sept. 11, 2000).
Our analysis, moreover, leads us to conclude that the most pernicious aspect of non-
publication rules lies in the courts' further efforts to prohibit appellants from talking or
arguing about unpublished decisions. As Judge Arnold put it, "[C]ourts are saying to the
bar: 'We may have decided this question the opposite way yesterday, but this does not bind
us today, and, what's more, you cannot even tell us what we did yesterday."' Anastasoff,
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limited to the following issue: Assuming, arguendo, that some or
all court rules permitting opinions to be designated as non-
precedential are constitutional, can the additional citation
prohibition-often justified as a necessary adjunct to a policy of
limited publication-pass constitutional muster? For two basic
reasons, we think it cannot.
First, citation prohibitions interfere with a litigant's First
Amendment right of speech and petition. By preventing
courtroom citation and discussion of relevant and often
important historical facts-i.e., the issuance of an opinion
resolving a dispute on specific facts and for stated reasons-
citation prohibitions diminish a litigant's ability to petition and
advocate his cause before the federal judiciary. Under prevailing
constitutional criteria, governmental restraints on speech and
petition are valid only if the proscribed speech is
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.'
Yet, as shown below, the countervailing social interest in order
and morality assertedly served by citation prohibitions is minor,
at best.
On the other hand, by prohibiting discussion of its own
opinions, a court labors under a self-inflicted judicial amnesia
that obscures the richness and history of its jurisprudence.
Citation prohibitions prevent aggrieved persons from bringing
whole categories of facts to the attention of the branch of
government charged with resolving disputes. At the same time,
such rules undermine the credibility of and respect for the
judicial system, as they constitute powerful tools that busy
courts can and do use to limit their accountability.
Importantly, non-publication and no-citation rules have not
been limited in their application to cases involving mundane
facts or legal principles that are unquestionably well settled. The
irony is that such rules would be unnecessary to deal with such
223 F.3d at 904. Stated otherwise, the evils condemned by Judge Arnold, in terms of
designating various decisions as non-precedential, may well be adequately ameliorated by
doing away with citation prohibitions.
6. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
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cases, because, by definition, they would rarely be cited anyway.
Rather, the appellate courts have been using the no-publication
and no-citation rules with increasing frequency in cases raising
issues of first impression that are of major public and legal
significance.
Second, as addressed in Section IV, citation prohibitions
violate the separation of powers and are ultra vires the federal
courts' Article III powers. Courts have the inherent power to
issue rules of practice and procedure that promote the just and
prompt disposition of the cases before them. Such rules may
affect the location, speed, or cost of a case, but not its
disposition. By this authority courts can, for example, require
that litigants' briefs be double-spaced or even dismiss a case on
forum non conveniens grounds. Citation prohibitions, however,
weaken a fundamental tool of courtroom advocacy-the
unfettered citation to and discussion of historical facts and,
arguably persuasive, even if non-binding, pronouncements and
writings. Instead of promoting the fair disposition of cases, no-
citation rules can interfere with their fair disposition, and, as
such, may be promulgated, if at all, only by the legislative
branch. It is the purpose of this article to fill in the analytical
gaps from prior discussions of this issue, and specifically, to
provide a framework for appreciating the reasons why these
rules should be revoked as unconstitutional under the First
Amendment and Article III. First, we will look at the history of
no-citation rules.
II. HISTORY OF No-CITATION RULES
Judge Arnold's opinion in Anastasoff is remarkable for its
portrayal of our judicial system as guilty of the same kinds of ill-
conceived miscalculations that the courts daily unveil in the
context of administrative agencies and large corporations. The
7. See infra nn. 64-75 and accompanying text. A recent example is the Federal
Circuit's designating as nonprecedential, nonpublishable, and noncitable, its decision to
hear an interlocutory appeal in a case challenging a practice known as "submarine
patenting" that has long vexed and been of great interest to the patent bar. See Symbol
Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., Ltd. Partn., 2000 WL 1300430
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 2000). Indeed, it would not be inconsistent with the historical practice of
that appellate court to designate the opinion it may reach as nonprecedential as well.
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federal judiciary is obviously subject to the same bureaucratic
susceptibilities as other large organizations. A peek into the
evolution of no-citation rules illustrates this point. The well-
intended rules emerged from a judicial system characterized by
dispersed authority, limited public accountability, and lack of a
core of management responsibility.
Most commentators trace the no-citation rules of the
various federal appellate courts back to the Judicial Conference
of the United States ("Judicial Conference").8 In 1964, the
Judicial Conference, citing "the rapidly growing number of
published opinions ... and the ever increasing practical
difficulty and economic cost of establishing and maintaining
accessible private and public law library facilities," adopted a
resolution asking federal court judges to "authorize the
publication of only those opinions which are of general
precedential value." 9
Picking up on the Judicial Conference's cue, in 1971 the
Federal Judicial Center ("Center") observed in its Annual
Report that there was "widespread agreement that too many
opinions are being printed and published." 'o The Center took
two steps to address the situation. First, in 1971, it brought
together distinguished lawyers, law professors, and judges to
form the Advisory Counsel on Appellate Justice ("Advisory
Counsel") to study the appellate process. Second, in 1972, the
Center recommended to the Judicial Conference that it ask each
circuit to review its publication practices and modify them to
reduce the number of published opinions and, significantly, to
restrict citation to these unpublished decisions.'' The Judicial
Conference adopted these recommendations and forwarded them
8. See e.g. Donna Stienstra, Unpublished Dispositions: Problems of Access and Use in
the Courts of Appeals (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1985). There have been intermittent calls to restrict
the publication of decisions, however, since the 1930s. E.g. William L. Reynolds &
William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-
Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1167, 1168-69
nn. 12-13 (1978).
9. Stienstra, supra n. 8, at 5-6 (quoting Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 11 (1964)).
10. Federal Judicial Center, Annual Report 7-8 (1971).
11. Board of the Federal Judicial Center, Recommendation and Report to the April
1972 Session of the Judicial Conference of the United States on the Publication of Courts
of Appeals Opinions (1972).
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to the circuits, requesting that the circuits respond with plans for
limiting the publication of opinions.
Shortly thereafter, in 1973, the Advisory Counsel published
a report, described by one commentator as the "seminal
document in the movement toward an official policy of limiting
publication," 12 that proposed a model rule for nonpublication
and recommended the adoption of an associated prohibition on
citation to unpublished decisions." By 1974, all the circuits had
responded to the Judicial Conference with their own plans for
implementation of the Advisory Counsel's recommendations.
4
Although the various plans were hardly uniform, as had been the
Counsel's hope, it conditionally accepted them.'5
Shortly thereafter, the Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System, a body that Congress created to
study problems relating to the appellate courts, held hearings on
the circuits' plans for nonpublication and citation to unpublished
opinions. '6  This commission, often called the Hruska
Commission after its chairman, Senator Roman L. Hruska, heard
testimony from judges, attorneys, and law professors.' A review
of the testimony reveals that, although the circuits'
nonpublication plans proved relatively uncontroversial,' the
proposed no-citation rules were not. Specifically, testifying
witnesses identified an equity-of-access dilemma: If citation of
12. Daniel N. Hoffman, Nonpublication of Federal Court Opinions, 6 Justice Sys. J.
405-06 (1981).
13. Federal Judicial Center, Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions: A Report
of the Committee on Use of Appellate Court Energies of the Advisory Counsel on Appellate
Justice (1 973).
14. Stienstra, supra n. 8, at 8.
15. See id. at 8-9.
16. Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (1972), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-420, 88
Stat. 1153 (1974), in Hearings before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System, Second Phase, vol. I (1974) & vol. 2 (1975); see also Stienstra, supra n.
8, at9 n. 21.
17. See Stienstra, supra n. 8, at 9.
18. See id. at 9-10:
A majority of the legal community agreed that not every case warrants a
published opinion, and it was clear to many that limiting the number of opinions
published could bring substantial relief to both the judiciary and the bar.
Proponents of this position noted that limited publication would reduce the
pressure on judges to write polished prose and the burden of restating the facts,
as well as reduce the costs attorneys incur in purchasing the reports and in
researching an ever-increasing body of law.
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unpublished opinions were permitted, then resource-poor
attorneys would be at a disadvantage, unable to access the large
body of case law physically located only at the courthouse. Yet
if citation of unpublished opinions were prohibited, then the
circuits risked creating a "hidden body of law" that, even if not
actually cited, would be "known and possibly relied upon by
judges and some litigators but unknown to the majority of the
bar." 19
It is at this point that the process became the victim of a
lack of clear leadership. In its final report in 1975, the Hruska
Commission appeared to reject the asserted basis for such rules:
Whether or not unpublished opinions may be cited by
litigants, judges may feel the obligation to maintain
consistency between cases presenting essentially the same
legal issues. For the judges to attempt consistency by
examining their own prior judgments, while denying
counsel the right to cite such cases compounds the
difficulties, whether counsel's purpose is to distinguish the
cases or to urge that they be followed. In addition, there are
some who consider it undesirable and indeed improper for
a court to deny a litigant the right to refer to action
20previously taken by the court.
Nonetheless, the Hruska Commission did not make a final
recommendation. Instead, it passed the ball back to the Judicial
Conference, calling it the "appropriate forum" for the resolution
of these issues."
The Judicial Conference, however, did not return to these
issues until 1978, when it issued its final statement on the
circuits' plans. Not only did it miss the constitutional issues
obviously raised by the proposals, it clearly did not wish to take
on any kind of real leadership role. It essentially did nothing,
stating:
At this time we are unable to say that one opinion
publication plan is preferable to another, nor is there a
sufficient consensus on either legal or policy matters, to
enable us to recommend a model rule. We believe that
19. See id. at 10-11.
20. Commn. on Revision of the Fed. Ct. App. Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures:
Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 259 (1975).
21. Id.
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continued experimentation under a variety of plans is
desirable.22
Since 1978, the Judicial Conference has been silent on this issue.
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee, a fifteen-
member panel appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist at the
direction of Congress, briefly returned to this debate. It
recommended that the Judicial Conference should again "review
policy on unpublished court opinions in light of increasing ease
and decreasing cost of database access." 23
Since the Judicial Conference's last words on the issue in
1978, practitioners have intermittently opposed no-citation rules.
In 1983, two bar panels-the Federal Bar Counsel's Committee
on Second Circuit Courts and the Committee on Criminal Law
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York-
commented on the Second Circuit's Rule 0.23, which prohibits
citation to unpublished opinions.24 The former, in a short report,
wrote that "the rule should not be abolished" but proposed an
amendment authorizing citation of summary orders. The latter,
in a lengthy report, concluded that "[t]he excessive use of
unpublished and uncitable opinion undermines the ability of the
Court to fulfill its vital function" and recommended that the
Second Circuit allow citation to unpublished opinions.26 In 1998,
another committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, this time the Committee on Federal Courts, made its
opposition to the Second Circuit's no-citation rule known.27
Moreover, practitioners have sought judicial review of no-
citation rules. The United States Supreme Court has twice
passed on opportunities to rule on the constitutionality of no-
citation rules. In Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court of
22. Subcommittee on Fed. Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ct. Admin., Opinion
Publication Plans in the United States Courts of Appeals 10-13 (Jud. Conf. of U.S. 1978).
23. Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee
130-31 (Apr. 2, 1990); see also Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and
Subcommittee Reports, July 1, 1990 vol. 1, 83-93 (1990); Federal Courts Study Committee,
Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports, June 1, 1990 vol. 2, 97 (1990).
24. See 2 Bar Panels Ask Change in Second Circuit Court Rule: City Bar, Federal Bar




27. Committee on Federal Courts, Report of the Committee on Federal Courts on the
Second Circuit's Rule Regarding Citation to Summary Orders (July 17, 1998).
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,8 petitioners sought review of
the Seventh Circuit's ruling striking their citation of an
unpublished decision. The Supreme Court, however, denied
leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus and prohibition. In
Bowder v. Director, Department of Corrections of Illinois," the
Court granted certiorari on several issues, including the
propriety of a circuit's no-citation rule, but did not address the
rule in its decision.30
It has largely been the academic community that has
questioned the two-tiered system of case law.3' But the
28. 429 U.S. 917 (1976).
29. 434 U.S. 257 (1978).
30. Id. at 258, 259 n. 1. In Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091 (4th
Cir. 1972), the circuit court addressed a closely related topic: whether its memoranda of
decision (summary orders on pro se appeals) could be denied precedential value. The court
held that they could be, conceding that
any decision is by definition a precedent, and ... we cannot deny litigants and
the bar the right to urge upon us what we have previously done. But because
memorandum decisions are not prepared with the assistance of the bar, we think
it reasonable to refuse to treat them as precedent ....
Id. at 1094. Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit did not elaborate just why "any decision is
by definition a precedent." Id.; see also People v. Valenzuela, 86 Cal. App. 3d 427, 443
(2d Dist. 1978) (Jefferson, J., dissenting) (defending California's no-citation rule).
31. E.g. Paul D. Carrington et al., Justice on Appeal 35-41 (West 1976); Keith H.
Beyler, Selective Publication Rules: An Empirical Study, 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1 (1989);
Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends of
Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy? 50 S.C. L. Rev.
235, 247-48 (1998) (listing twenty-three reasons why the practice of issuing unpublished
and uncitable decisions is bad); Martha Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish
if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial
Decisions Pose a Greater Threat? 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 757, 802 (1995); David Dunn,
Student Author, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 Cornell
L. Rev. 128 (1977); Paul Marcotte, Unpublished but Influential, 77 ABA J. 26 (Jan. 1991);
Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: A
Reassessment, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 119, 120 (1994); Richard L. Neumeier,
Unpublished Opinions: Their Threat to the Appellate System, 17 Brief 22, 40 (Spring
1988); Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 Am. U.
L. Rev. 909, 928 (1986); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Elitism,
Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell
L. Rev. 273, 284 (1996); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited
Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 Duke L.J. 806, 809; William L.
Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1167,
1205 (1978); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished
Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Court of Appeals, 87 Mich. L.
Rev. 940, 946 (1989); Philip Shuman & Alan Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the
Fifth Circuit: Can Judges Select Cases of "No Precedential Value"? 29 Emory L.J. 195
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academics' consistent criticism of nonpublication and no-
citation rules has rested almost exclusively on policy grounds
rather than constitutional ones. Two authors have suggested in
passing that citation prohibitions may violate the First
Amendment,32 but there has been no extensive analysis of why
that might be so. Similarly, there have been glancing assertions
in two publications that no-citation rules unconstitutionally
undermine stare decisis-the basic rationale of Judge Arnold's
decision in Anastasoff.33 However, we submit that this argument
skirts the more fundamental issues.34 Finally, although two
articles have suggested that citation prohibitions and
nonpublication rules may offend the separation of powers,35 both
fail to put forward the most compelling arguments.36 We will
(1980); Stienstra, supra n. 8, at 5; see also Natl. Classification Comm. v. U.S., 765 F.2d
164, 173 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wald, J., writing separately) (discussing various criticisms
of the practice of issuing unpublished opinions); but see Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of
Unpublished Opinions, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 177 (1999).
32. Carpenter, supra n. 31; Neumeier, supra n. 31.
33. See Arthur B. Spitzer & Charles H. Wilson, The Mischief of the Unpublished
Opinion, 21 Litig. 3 (Summer 1995); Neumeier, supra n. 31.
34. Simply, collateral stare decisis is a principle with no teeth. Courts need not follow
the precedent set by a collateral court, and rarely feel constrained to do so when the
relevant precedent is logically unsound. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)
("Although adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis is usually the best policy, the doctrine
is not an inexorable command. This Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent
when governing decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned, particularly in constitutional
cases, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible.") (discussing
direct stare decisis) (internal citation omitted); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665
(1944) (" [W]hen convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow
precedent.") (discussing direct stare decisis).
35. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for
Reporting of Opinions: A Critique, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 313, 320 (1985); Howard Slavitt,
Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective Publication, Depublication, and
Vacatur, 30 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 109 (1995).
36. Slavitt asserts, without citation:
In addition to undermining the appearance of justice, nonpublication interferes
with the separation of powers between the judicial and political branches.
Because nonpublication often hides the actual state of the law, it may
substantially reduce the possibility of legislative reversal.
Slavitt, supra n. 35, at 133. However, no court has held that, nor does the author offer any
analysis to support his assertion that "hiding the actual state of the law" interferes with the
separation of powers. Indeed, as discussed below, the court can issue its decision orally,
without a written opinion, which is an act that quite legitimately "hides the actual state of
the law" far more than any citation prohibition.
Richman and Reynolds, on the other hand, give a more detailed critique. They assert
that "a common law court that is not bound by its own decisions has, in some sense, ceased
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now look at the First Amendment and Article III and discuss
why the no-citation rules should be revoked as unconstitutional.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT
The first of the two reasons that no-citation rules are
unconstitutional is that they violate the First Amendment. The
First Amendment issues raised by no-citation rules can be
viewed from the perspective of the Petition Clause or the Free
Speech Clause. The analysis proceeds identically under both.
The Petition Clause of the First Amendment states that Congress
shall make no law abridging "the right of the people
peaceably ... to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."37 The Supreme Court has held that this right
extends to all departments of the government and includes the
"right of access to the courts." 38 This First Amendment
to act purely as a court and may be exercising power that is decidedly nonjudicial."
Richman & Reynolds, supra n. 35, at 321. Generally, it is true that courts follow precedent
while, in contradistinction, the legislature has almost unfettered freedom to ignore
precedent (save constitutional constraints). Yet, as discussed above, a court is not acting
improperly (or like a legislature) when it rules contrary to a collateral court. It may be more
troubling that no-citation rules permit trial courts to ignore an unpublished appellate
mandate.
Nonetheless, for two reasons, a trial court that rules contrary to an uncitable
appellate decision is not exercising a "decidedly legislative function." First, a trial court is
still highly constrained from acting like a legislature: It is still bound by the published
common law and by statutory law. Second, and more important, any aberrant trial court
decision is still subject to review by an appellate court that itself is not constrained to
follow the decisions of collateral courts-so if the trial court's putatively "legislative"
opinion is indeed illegitimate, it will be reversed. Thus the argument that a trial court acts
like a legislature when it issues an opinion contrary to an uncitable appellate decision is
belied by the fact that such a court acts no more like a legislature than does one that
commits reversible error, an act that cannot itself be condemned as unconstitutional.
37. U.S. Const. amend. 1.
38. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972);
Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Pizzolato v. Perez, 524 F.
Supp. 914 (E.D. La. 1981); In re N.C. Trading, 586 F.2d 221 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1978).
Courts have also located as the source of this right of access to the courts in "the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, section 2, and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments." Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1997);
see also Simmons v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182, 183 (1st Cir. 1986) (listing several sources of
authority for right of access to courts). These other sources of authority are implicated
when the state interferes with access through the courts in ways other than the strict
suppression of speech, such as the alleged destruction of materials useful in a prisoner's
appeal. See Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344, 345-47 (2d Cir. 1987).
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right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other
guarantees of that Amendment, and is an assurance of a
particular freedom of expression ... this right is implicit in
"[t]he very idea of government, republican in form."
39
Thus, where government action allegedly interferes with the
right of petition through the suppression of speech, the claim is
"generally subject to the same constitutional analysis" as a
freedom of speech claim.
The Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting Corporation v.
Cohn41 is instructive and illustrates the relevant constitutional
criteria. In Cox, the father of a deceased rape victim brought an
action against a broadcasting company and others to recover
damages for an invasion of the father's right of privacy. The
invasion, the father alleged, occurred when the television
broadcasting company, in contravention of a Georgia statute,
identified his daughter as the victim when covering her rapist's
trial. The Court found, however, that the father's action could
not proceed. It held that a state may not, consistent with the First
Amendment (as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment),
39. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) (quoting U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 552 (1876)) (internal citations omitted).
40. Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 610 n. 11 (1985); see also White Plains Towing Corp.
v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049, 1059 (2d Cir. 1993); Day v. South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 768
F.2d 696, 701 (5th Cir. 1985) (" [Petitioner] assumes that, when a government employer
deals with its own employees, the protection afforded by the petition clause is entirely
discrete from and broader than the shield afforded by the other clauses of the first
amendment, a premise that is undermined by the Supreme Court's repeated references to
these clauses as being overlapping."); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 412 (7th Cir. 1989)
(" [C]ourts analyze an alleged violation of the petition clause in the same manner as any
other alleged violation of the right to engage in free speech. Therefore, in deciding whether
a public employer has wrongfilly deprived an employee of his right to petition the
government, our inquiry must begin with whether the petition touched upon a matter of
public concern by looking at the content, form, and context of the petition.") (internal
citations omitted); Belk v. Town of Minocqua, 858 F.2d 1258, 1261 (7th Cir. 1988) ("To
accept petitioner's claim of absolute immunity would elevate the Petition Clause to special
First Amendment status. The Petition Clause, however, was inspired by the same ideals of
liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble. These
First Amendment rights are inseparable and there is no sound basis for granting greater
constitutional protection to statements made in a petition ... than other First Amendment
expressions.") (quoting McDonald, 472 U.S. at 479); Hoffnann v. Mayor of Liberty, 905
F.2d 229, 233 (8th Cir. 1990) ("While we recognize that the right of petition can be
exercised differently from the right of free speech, as the first amendment is implicated in
this case, we conclude that the petition clause provides no lesser or greater guarantee of
free expression than the speech clause.").
41. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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impose sanctions on the accurate publication of a rape victim's
name obtained from judicial records that are open to public
inspection.42
The Georgia statute's cause of action for invasion of
privacy imposed a sanction on "pure expression," defined as
"the content of a publication-and not conduct or a combination
of speech and nonspeech elements., 43 The government may
proscribe "pure expression," the Court held, only in certain
limited situations. That is-as the Court had established in 1942
and has repeated in numerous opinions thereafter-the
government may impose sanctions for expressions made in
defiance of social values and morality."
In Cox Broadcasting, because the "social value" of the
targeted expression outweighed the "social interest" served by
an invasion of privacy statute, the state legislation could not
survive First Amendment scrutiny.45
Federal court no-citation rules are, quite clearly, acts of
government that are directly subject to First Amendment
scrutiny.46  They target the content of expression. To be
constitutional, the "social interest in order and morality" served
by no-citation rules must outweigh their "social value as a step
to truth. 47 Yet, as will be shown below, citation prohibitions
utterly fail this balancing test. The target expression, the
discussion of unpublished cases, is hardly of "slight social
42. Id.
43. Id. at 495.
44. See id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (footnote
omitted)); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 430 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); McDonald, 472 U.S. at 487 (Brennan, J., concurring);
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984).
45. Cox, 420 U.S. at 495.
46. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1982) (holding Missouri rule restricting
lawyer advertising to certain categories of information and sometimes certain language
unconstitutional; lawyer's advertising was not misleading, and restriction was not
reasonably necessary to further substantial interest); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350, 379, 384 (1977) (holding Arizona rule banning attorney advertising unconstitutional;
"proffered justifications" for rule given by state bar were inadequate to justify
"suppression of all advertising by attorneys"); see also 21 C.J.S. Courts § 126 (1990) ("A
court [rule] is subject to limitations based on reasonableness and conformity to
constitutional and statutory provisions, and their validity will be tested by the same
standards applicable to statutes.").
47. Cox, 420 U.S. at 495.
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value."4 At the same time, the "social interest in order and
morality"4 9 is at best only marginally served by no-citation rules.
Because citation rules dampen pure expression, the "social
interest in order and morality" served by no-citation rules must
be weighed against the "social value as a step to truth"50 of the
expression sanctioned.
A. The Asserted Justifications for the No-Citation Rules, in
Terms of Furthering the Interest in Social Order,
Are Weak at Best
Courts and commentators have offered three rationales for
citation prohibitions:"
(1) necessity (without such rules, the purposes of selective
publication would be frustrated);
(2) lack of clarity (unpublished memoranda and opinions
should not be cited because they may not disclose fully the
rationale of the court's decision); and
(3) otherwise unfair (only litigants with deep pockets can
access unpublished decisions, thus without the rule, smaller
firms and solo practitioners would be disadvantaged).
These three justifications appear wholly inadequate to
support the imposed preclusion of speech. Each justification is
discussed in turn below.
1. No-Citation Rules Are Not Necessary to Implement the
Alleged Benefits of Selective Publication Policies
Commentators generally cite four purposes of selective




51. See Martineau, supra n. 31, at 145; Kirt Shuldberg, Digital Influence: Technology
and Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 541, 549-50
(1997); Ist Cir. R. 36 (2000).
52. See Martin, supra n. 31, passim; Martineau, supra n. 31, at 120; Nichols, supra
n. 31, at 928.
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(1) conservation of judicial resources (lawyers and courts
can spend less time wading through duplicative or
unimportant decisions);
(2) increased court productivity (it takes significant time to
write a full decision, and courts simply could not write full
decisions in all cases);
(3) reduction of costs (courts and lawyers need not spend
money buying case reporters that are full of unimportant
decisions); and
(4) greater emphasis to published opinions (decisions
should only be necessary where the court establishes a new
rule of law; expands, alters, or modifies an existing rule;
involves a legal issue of continuing public interest;
criticizes existing law; or resolves a conflict of authority).
For the most part, however, even accepting these arguments as
legitimate, no-citation rules do not appear necessary to give
them effect.
The argument that unpublished opinions allow courts and
the bar to save time otherwise spent reviewing duplicative or
unimportant cases is only slightly furthered by citation
prohibitions. It is true that citation prohibitions allow lawyers
and courts to ignore unpublished opinions with the confidence
that they have not overlooked binding precedent. There are two
reasons, however, why this concern is minimal. First, for many
issues, there are few on-point but uncitable appellate decisions,
so the time it takes to review these decisions is short. For the
most part, the myth that there exist great batches of redundant
unpublished appellate cases is true only in certain discrete areas
of law where meritless cases are litigated even to appeal-e.g.,
cases involving prisoners and social security claimants.53 Yet
even if these cases were citable, courts and practitioners would
not waste their time plowing through them for subtle shades of
precedent, but would understand, guided by experience or
treatises, that the case law is well settled. Second, in practice,
citation prohibitions hardly ease the case-review burden on the
53. See Federal Courts Study Committee, Report March 12, 1990 86 ("[S]ome
categories of appeal-particularly those involving aliens, prisoners, and social security
claimants-are decided in published opinions only infrequently."); Robel, supra n. 31, at
955 (" [U]npublished opinions tend to cluster in subject-matter areas.").
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prudent practitioner. Practitioners often review uncitable cases
to mine them for new ideas. A prudent lawyer also reviews
unpublished cases, lack of precedential value aside, because they
indicate how the appellate court has ruled in the past and thus
might rule in the future. Moreover, it behooves counsel to
review unpublished opinions because they still may influence a
court that reads (or remembers deciding) them itself. 4 Thus,
citation prohibitions may further slightly the conservation of
judicial resources, but this justification for citation prohibitions
is weak.
The second argument-that unpublished opinions increase
court productivity-is not materially forwarded by citation
prohibitions. A court may be more inclined to issue a short
opinion (intended only for the parties at bar) where it is sure that
future parties could not cite it; in these circumstances, a court in
its opinion may assume familiarity with the facts or issue an
opinion limited to a single, very narrow point of law.
Alternatively, a court may feel less compelled to carefully
review its choice of language when future courts will not be
interpreting a decision. For two reasons, however, citation
prohibitions are not necessary to keep such abbreviated or less-
than-perfectly worded opinions from being misunderstood by
posterity. First, a court can, with nothing more than a sentence
or two, explain the boundaries of its opinion. A court can, for
example, state that "familiarity with the facts is assumed," or it
can warn that the opinion is not to be interpreted beyond the
limited legal issue addressed therein. Second, in the unlikely
event that an appellate court finds itself unable to craft such an
54. See Mohr v. Jordan, 370 F. Supp. 1149, 1154 (D. Md. 1974) ("In citing these three
Memorandum Decisions, this Court is aware.., that memorandum decisions ordinarily
should not be treated as precedent .... However, here ... all [memoranda] flatly hold[]
that [the law] requires the crediting of time spent in jail."); Curley v. Bryan, 362 F. Supp.
48, 52 n. 2 (D.S.C. 1973) ("The court cites Gatling, an unreported memorandum decision,
with some trepidation.... [Wihile Gatling, in the strictest sense, may not have stare decisis
control over the instant case, this court thinks the principle stated there remains valid and
should be applied to the case at bar.") (internal citations omitted); Durkin v. Davis, 390 F.
Supp. 249, 254 (E.D. Va. 1975) ("Although the Court is mindful of the Fourth Circuit's
admonition that memorandum decisions are not to be accorded precedential value, the legal
trend evinced by these four memorandum decisions ... leads the Court to the conclusion
that it is now the law in this circuit.") (internal citations omitted). In 1976, the Fourth
Circuit amended its rules, allowing unpublished dispositions to have precedential value. 4th
Cir. R. 18(d) (1982) (now 36(c) (1995)). See infra n. 58.
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abbreviated opinion, it need not issue an opinion at all (an act
that would spare even more judicial resources). "[T]he courts of
appeals ... have wide latitude in their decisions of whether or
how to write opinions,"" and thus a "litigant's right to have all
issues fully considered and ruled on by the appellate court does
not equate to a right to a full written opinion on every issue
raised."56 If, in fact, a decision in a particular case is obvious and
clearly based on well-settled law, the opinion can and should be
briefly stated, and there should be no basis for worry that
citation of such an opinion will cause confusion or unduly
burden subsequent tribunals, if we assume, as we can, the
existence of a judiciary that is by and large quite competent. If
the ostensible concern has to do with redundant opinions on
well-settled issues, only the most incompetent of judiciaries
would require a no-citation rule as a useful, let alone necessary
tool to prevent confusion and inefficiency.
55. Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n. 4 (1972); see also Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 482 n. 6 (1972) (reviewing court of appeals' summary affirmance without
comment on its summary nature); Taylor, 407 U.S. at 195-96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority's disparaging reference to fact that Fifth Circuit did not write opinion
because, dissent recognized, a court of appeals need not do so).
56. Furman v. U.S., 720 F.2d 263, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Garza, 165 F.3d 312,
314 (5th Cir. 1999); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, 103 F.3d 1554, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Indeed, "Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure... expressly contemplates
that some appeals will be decided without an opinion." Furman, 720 F.2d at.264. Furman
cites Rule 36:
The notation of a judgment in the docket constitutes entry of the judgment ...
If a judgment is rendered without an opinion, the clerk shall prepare, sign and
enter the judgment following instruction from the court. The clerk shall, on the
date judgment is entered, mail to all parties a copy of the opinion, if any, or of
the judgment if no opinion was written, and notice of the date of entry of the
judgment.
Id. (omission in original). The fact that courts may rule without written opinion, however,
has not been free from criticism. See e.g. Christopher F. Carlton, The Grinding Wheel of
Justice Needs Some Grease: Designing the Federal Courts of the Twenty-First Century, 6
Kan. J.L. & Pub. Policy 1, 9-10 (1997) (writing, a bit hyperbolically, that "the practice of
allowing a decision without a written opinion has been uniformly condemned by
commentators and lawyers"); Nathan Dodell, On Wanting to Know Why, 2 Fed. Cir. B.J.
465 (1992). Of course, as noted by Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York,
[A]n articulated discussion of the factors, legal, factual or both, which lead the
Court to one rather than to another result, gives strength to the system, and
reduces, if not eliminates, the easy temptation or tendency to ill-considered or
even arbitrary action by those having the awesome power of almost final review.
Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J., dissenting),
affid, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am., 430
F.2d 966. 972 (5th Cir. 1970)).
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The third purpose behind unpublished decisions-that they
reduce costs (by reducing the size of published case reporters)-
is not furthered by citation prohibitions. Simply, it is the act of
designating a decision as unpublished and non-precedential that
keeps an opinion out of the reporters; no-citation rules do
nothing to reduce the size of reporters. Moreover, in this age of
Westlaw and Lexis, those lawyers who are concerned about the
expense of reporters need not buy them.
Finally, the fourth purpose behind unpublished opinions-
that they give greater emphasis to published opinions-is also
not served by citation prohibitions. What gives emphasis to an
opinion is the appellate court's designation of it as
"unpublished" or "published.'' 57 When a court designates an
opinion as unpublished, no further sign is needed to convey the
message the opinion is not binding and does not carry the
precedential weight of a published one. In sum, no-citation rules
are not necessary to give effect to the purposes of selective
publication in any significant way.
2. No-Citation Rules Are Not Necessary to Overcome the
Asserted Lack of Clarity in Unpublished Case Law
The second purported purpose of citation prohibitions-
that unpublished memoranda and opinions should not be cited
because they do not fully disclose the rationale of the court's
decision-seems likewise unsound. As discussed above, courts
are fully capable of treating summary decisions on well-settled
points with the appropriate, diminished amount of precedential
deference. Indeed, several federal appellate courts allow citation
to unpublished opinions,58 and the Supreme Court has never
57. The terms "published" and "unpublished" are something of a misnomer, since all
decisions of the courts of appeals are, strictly speaking, published.
58. 4th Cir. R. 36(c) (1995) (citation to unpublished opinions "disfavored," but
allowed, with "precedential value," when "there is no published opinion that would serve
as well"); 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3 & 47.5.4 (1999) (unpublished opinions issued on or after
January 1, 1996 are not precedent but may be cited as persuasive authority; unpublished
opinions issued before January 1, 1996, however, "should normally be cited only when the
doctrine of resjudicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case is applicable"); 6th Cir. I.O.P.
22.1-22.6 (repealed 1998) (citation to unpublished cases "disfavored," but allowed
nonetheless); 10th Cir. R. 36.3 (1999) (citation to unpublished opinion "disfavored," but
allowed if "(1) it has persuasive value with respect to a material issue that has not been
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promulgated a no-citation rule. The courts in general could take
their nod from the Supreme Court, which pragmatically treats its
own summary decisions as precedent, albeit precedent with less
weight than a decision supported by a full, written opinion."
3. No-Citation Rules Are Not Necessary to Level the Playing
Field as between Litigants with Unequal Economic Power
The third purported purpose of citation prohibitions is that,
without them, smaller firms and solo practitioners would be
unfairly disadvantaged. This argument is based on the fact that
unpublished decisions are not put in reporters, and therefore, in
theory, are only available to those lawyers with the resources to
continually access the large body of precedent physically located
only in the courthouse. This theory misjudges the impact of no-
citation rules on the small firm and solo practitioner bar, and it
also fails to take account of the revolution in computerized and
Internet data resources.
It should be noted at the outset that nonpublication rules
may actually increase the advantage that big firms have. If only
big firm lawyers have access to unpublished cases, then only
those lawyers can mine those cases for ideas, language, and
argument. " [B]ecause the opinions are most often distributed
only to parties and judges, the frequent litigants will have unique
access to a useful source of information known only to them and
the judges before whom they appear." 60
More importantly, with the almost universal use of CD-
ROM libraries and on-line resources such as Lexis and Westlaw
(and to an increasing degree free Web resources), these fairness
addressed in a published opinion; and (2) it would assist the court in its disposition"); 11 th
Cir. 36.2 (2000) (unpublished opinions "may be cited as persuasive authority").
59. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 390 n. 9 (1979); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 366-67 n. 16 (1975); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("[T]hese
three summary affirmances obviously are of precedential value .... Equally obviously,
they are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating
the question on the merits"); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974); George M.
Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39 Mercer L. Rev. 477
(1988). The Fifth Circuit has taken this approach on occasion. See Peters v. U.S., 9 F.3d
344, 346 (5th Cir. 1993) (relying on unpublished precedent); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
4 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993) (considering court to be bound by unpublished case
because "unpublished opinions [are] binding precedent").
60. Robel, supra n. 31, at 9 55 .
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concerns are largely outdated. "Unpublished" cases are hardly
that: They are available to all through various electronic or other
means.6 This factor led the Federal Courts Study Committee in
1990 to point out that "inexpensive database access and
computerized search techniques may reduce inequality problems
[of unpublished decisions] enough to warrant revisiting the issue
[of publication]."6 2
In sum, pulling this discussion back into the relevant First
Amendment context, the "interest in order and morality" served
by citation prohibitions seems unquestionably minor. The
various circuits do not need no-citation rules to keep order in
their courts. These rules do little to forward the reasons
proffered for their existence; to verify this assertion, one need
look no further than the fact that numerous courts have
successfully gotten by without them.
B. Unpublished Case Law Is Not Without Substantial Value as a
Step to Truth
Even assuming the existence of substantial justifications for
no-citation rules, they nonetheless will not survive First
Amendment challenge unless the benefits outweigh the "social
value [of the banned speech] as a step to truth." 63Apparently, no-
citation rules were originally justified on the assumption that the
appellate 'courts would only designate as unpublished those
cases in which no new law is established, no law is expanded,
altered, or modified, and no existing law is criticized. Under
such circumstances, there should be no occasion or reason to
cite such cases for any purpose, and the prospect of large firms
nonetheless citing them and imposing costs and uncertainty on
less well-heeled litigants and on the courts would
understandably cause concern.
61. See Shuldberg, supra n. 51, at 549-51.
62. Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports, July
1, 1990 vol. 2, 98 (1990). Further, a circuit court could implement, as some have, measures
to otherwise rectify this theoretical inequity. If it does not already, a circuit could put its
unpublished rulings in a simple index and make the unpublished decisions available in full
in easily accessible repositories of judicial opinions open to all practitioners.
63. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
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The fact is, however, that almost from their outset the
nonpublication and no-citation rules have been used to bury
decisions that under no circumstances can be considered trivial
and mundane repetitions of blackletter law. Nor, in any event,
has redundancy or repetition ever served as a justification for the
prohibition of speech.
As noted earlier, the right of the courts to designate certain
opinions as "unpublished" is not the focus of this article. For
present purposes, we assume, arguendo, that courts may
properly deny an opinion some or all its power to bind
subsequent courts as stare decisis. These assumptions, however,
by no means warrant a no-citation rule.
1. Many Unpublished Decisions Are Unique
One of the most fundamental problems with the "harmless
error" argument-that no-citation rules are justified because
they hide only redundant opinions-is that it speaks in
theoretical terms that conflict with actual practice. The prior
unpublished Eighth Circuit opinion that the Anastasoff panel
held it was constitutionally bound to follow was a case of first
impression under the federal tax law.64 And there are numerous
unpublished opinions with concurrences and even dissents,
indicating that not even the judges of the appellate court found
the issues before them uncontroversial." Unpublished reversals,
64. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899 (citing Christie v. U.S., No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir.
Mar. 20, 1992)).
65. See Pantojas v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1565 (table), 1992 WL
104943 at *3 (lst Cir. May 19, 1992) (Selya, J., dissenting) (finding "the opinion of the
court below ... more persuasive") (internal citation omitted); Wheatley v. U.S., 201 F.3d
439 (table), 1999 WL 1080121 at *3 (4th Cir. Nov. 30, 1999) (King, J., dissenting) ("the
majority has overbroadly applied the 'Good Samaritan' defense"); U.S. v. May, 202 F.3d
270 (table), 1999 WL 1253078 at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 1999) (Moore, J., dissenting) (citing
decisions of other circuits and stating, "I do not believe that the government has met its
burden of [proof]"); Gomez v. DeTella, 139 F.3d 901 (table), 1998 WL 60387 at *5 (7th
Cir. Feb. 6, 1998) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (implying that majority did not "pay close
attention" to evidentiary line between likelihood of guilt and reasonable doubt); Boston v.
Bowersox, 1999 WL 1143680 (8th Cir. Nov. 26, 1999) (Heany, J., dissenting) (stating that
jury selection process of county may be unconstitutional); Alfaro-Rodriguez v. INS, 203
F.3d 830 (table), 1999 WL 1091990 at **4-5 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 1999) (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting) (petitioner should not have been denied asylum); Winters v. Transamerica his.
Co., 194 F.3d 1321 (table), 1999 WL 699835 at *6 (10th Cir. Sept. 9, 1999) (Brorby, J.,
dissenting) ("I strongly disagree" that insurance coverage was appropriate); O'Connell v.
Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 217 F.3d 857 (table), 1999 WL 1039699 at *2 (Fed. Cir.
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most of which serve as unique clarifications of the law-had the
point of law at bar been uncontroversial and straightforward, the
district court probably would not have gotten it wrong-also
cannot be termed redundant.66  Moreover, there are even
unpublished cases that are clearly inconsistent with published
cases of the same circuit.
67
Nov. I, 1999) (Plager, J., dissenting) (stating that a section of the Vaccine Act "violates the
Presentment Clause of the Constitution" ).
66. See e.g. Quilichini-Paz v. Ramirez-Soto, 187 F.3d 622 (table), 1998 WL 1085764 at
*2 (1st Cir. Dec. 4, 1998) (per curiam) (district court erred in finding that appellant was not
an arm of Puerto Rico for the purpose of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Demarco v.
Sadiker, 199 F.3d 1321 (table), 1999 WL 1024696 at **1-3 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 1999) (district
court improperly granted summary judgment when it should have instead allowed for
discovery on qualified immunity defense); Mayer v. City of Hackensack Constructions Bd.
of App., 193 F.3d 514 (table) (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 1999) (no information on decision beyond
disposition-reversed); Girardi v. Heep, 203 F.3d 820 (table), 2000 WL 1287 at **4-5 (4th
Cir. Dec. 30, 1999) (in opinion with dissent, appellant found to have been denied due
process by court below); Jones v. American Council, 196 F.3d 1258 (table) (5th Cir. Sept.
21, 1999) (no information on decision beyond disposition-reversed); U.S. v. Dover, 201
F.3d 441 (table), 1999 WL 1204794 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 1999) (in extensive decision with
dissent, reversing "willful obstruction of justice" sentence enhancement of defendant
found guilty of bank fraud); Braxton v. Amoco Oil Co., 202 F.3d 272 (table), 1999 WL
1256565 at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 1999) (in extensive decision, reversing summary
judgment granted against plaintiff who had claimed that his union breached a duty of fair
representation and his employer breached a collective bargaining agreement); Hyatt v.
Gammon, 187 F.3d 641 (table), 1999 WL 627573 at *1 (8th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999) (district
court erred in finding timely filed petition untimely); Lucido v. Compreview, Inc., 205 F.3d
1351 (table), 1999 WL 1253221 at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 1999) (reversing because district
court did not afford parties opportunity to brief or argue issue appealed); Janssen v. Cobe
Laboratories, Inc., 201 F.3d 448 (table), 1999 WL 1063836 at *1 (IOth Cir. Nov. 24, 1999)
(in extensive opinion in employment discrimination case, finding that the district court
improperly granted summary judgment and costs to defendant); Olsen v. U.S., 196 F.3d
1260 (table) (1 Ith Cir. Sept. 24, 1999) (no information on decision beyond disposition-
reversed in part, vacated in part); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 172
F.3d 919 (table), 1999 WL 66032 at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan 20, 1999) (district court erred by not
sending attorneys' fees question to jury and by not granting a motion to dismiss of two
parties); Manchak v. Chem. Waste Mgt., Inc., 217 F.3d 860 (table), 1999 WL 1103364 at
*1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 1999) (district court erred in its construction of claims of patent at
issue "and thereby improperly found both literal and equivalent infringement").
67. Compare U.S. v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1975) (published opinion in
which "founded suspicion" for investigatory stop treated as question of law), with U.S. v.
Alvarez-Garcia, No. 74-2789 (9th Cir. Jan 28, 1975) (unpublished opinion where "founded
suspicion" was treated as finding of fact), and U.S. v. Johnson, No. 74-2552 (9th Cir. Mar.
12, 1975) (unpublished opinion in which there was confusion as to whether "founded
suspicion" should be reviewed as finding of law or finding of fact); see also James N.
Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice, 61 ABA J. 1224
(1975) (cataloging inconsistent Ninth Circuit unpublished decisions from 1974 and 1975).
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In addition to the prior Eighth Circuit decision at issue in
Anastasoff, Westlaw abounds with other unpublished cases of
first impression.68 Such cases leave a district court with two
equally unattractive choices. 69 The district court can, as some
have, expressly follow an unpublished decision--even in the
face of its lack of precedential value ° and citation prohibitions.7'
68. See e.g. U.S. v. English, 173 F.3d 852 (table), 1999 WL 123556 at *1 (4th Cir.
March 9, 1999) (addressing as matter of first impression-indeed, a matter on which the
circuits are split--circumstances under which sentencing under youthful offender statute is
an adult conviction under Sentencing Guidelines); Ronald Mayotte & Assoc. v. MGC Bldg.
Co., 149 F.3d 1184 (table), 1998 WL 385905 at **1-3 (6th Cir. July 1, 1998) (affirming,
but recognizing that district court was the first to deny attorney's fees to a prevailing
plaintiff in copyright case because of responsible behavior on part of attorneys in discovery
process); Hampton v. American Plumbing & Sewer, Inc., 95 F.3d 1154 (table), 1996 WL
479227 at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 21, 1996) (addressing as matter of first impression whether
Fair Labor Standards Act § 216(b) allows recovery of fees for nontestimonal expert
services); Pelican State Supply Co. v. Cushman, Inc., 39 F.3d 1184 (table), 1994 WL
587042 at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 27, 1994) ("[W]e must predict how the Nebraska Supreme
Court would decide this case of first impression under Nebraska law."); Moore v. Security-
Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 906 (table), 1998 WL 78916 at *6 (9th Cir. Feb. 19,
1998) (predicting state law: "Although the California Supreme Court's position is unclear,
we think that that court would decline [appellant's] invitation to apply the general
rule..."); Medina v. Pacheco, 161 F.3d 18 (table), 1998 WL 647784 at **4-5 (10th Cir.
Sept. 14, 1998) (predicting, as matter of first impression, how New Mexico's courts would
resolve question of whether intentional tort survives unrelated death of plaintiff); Bruning
v. Hirose, 1998 WL 690851, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 1998) (recognizing
that issue of appropriate burden of proof addressed by court was matter of first impression).
69. Some circuits, however, have rules that allow counsel to petition to convert an
unpublished case into a published one. The circuit courts hearing motions to publish are as
follows: 1st Cir. (R. 36.2(b)(4)); 4th Cir. (I.O.P. 36.5); 5th Cir. (R. 47.5.2); 7th Cir. (R.
53(d)(3)); 9th Cir. (R. 36-4); 1 1th Cir. (R. 36-2 I.O.P.(5)); D.C. Cir. (R. 36(d)); Fed. Cir.
(R. 47.8(c)). These rules allowing counsel and others to petition for a case's publication do
not save no-citation rules from constitutional infirmity. If the Constitution requires that all
cases be citable, then there is no justification for rules that allow the court discretion to
deny counsel that right. These rules thus only serve to force counsel to waste resources and,
possibly, offend the court before which counsel appears by criticizing the court's decision
not to publish. Moreover, citation prohibitions also offend the separation of powers, and
these rules do nothing to mitigate that ill.
70. See e.g. Giese v. Pierce Chem. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 98, 103-04 n. 1 (D. Mass. 1999)
("When a district court chooses to follow an unpublished opinion, it further explicates its
own analysis-always a desirable result-by reference to legal reasoning it considers
persuasive albeit not binding. That is what the Court has done here."); Mohr v. Jordan, 370
F. Supp. 1149, 1154 (D. Md. 1974); Curley v. Bryan, 362 F. Supp. 48, 52 n. 2 (D.S.C.
1973); Durkin v. Davis, 390 F. Supp. 249, 254 (E.D. Va. 1975); see also discussion supra
n. 54.
71. People v. Valenzuela, 86 Cal. App. 3d 427, 439 (2d Dist. 1978) (Jefferson, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that this case was not the first in which the Appellate Department
of the Superior Court has authorized citation of an unpublished opinion, contrary to the
pertinent citation prohibitions).
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The second choice is for the district court to inform counsel, as
in the case of a Wisconsin district court, that it is obliged to
ignore that a higher court had ruled a certain way when faced
with the same question.72 Yet to do so, as another district court
noted, "place[s] the Court in the untenable position of looking to
the format of the decision rather than to the ultimate fact that the
decision is signed by three learned judges of the Court."73 Secret
law is abhorrent to our system of justice, and our courts should
not be required to blind themselves to relevant historical fact.
As Chief Judge Holloway of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has written, "[W]e [judges] are not in as informed a
position as we might believe. Future developments may well
reveal that the [unpublished] ruling is significant indeed."74
Similarly, in a frank moment, the Second Circuit has admitted
its own fallibility, writing that there are circumstances under
which its decision not to publish "may not be in the public
interest."75 Also, as Justice Stevens of the United States
Supreme Court observed in an address before the Illinois State
Bar,
[A no-citation rule] assumes that an author is a reliable
judge of the quality and importance of his own work
product. If I need authority to demonstrate the invalidity of
that assumption, I refer you to a citizen of Illinois who gave
a brief talk in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania that he did not
expect to be long remembered. Judges are the last persons
72. U.S. v. Erving, 388 F. Supp. 1011, 1017 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
73. Herndon v. Superintendent, Virginia State Farm, 351 F. Supp. 1356, 1358 (E.D.
Va. 1972). There is other, anecdotal evidence of unpublished opinions acting as de facto
authority. See Marcotte, supra n. 31, at 26.
74. Re Rules of U.S. Ct. App. for Tenth Cir., Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955 F.2d 36, 38
(10th Cir. 1992) (Holloway, C.J., dissenting).
75. Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Co. v. SEC, 566 F.2d 373, 374 n. I (2d Cir.
1977) ("We express our appreciation to the [parties] for having brought to our attention the
considerations which justify publication of our opinion in the instant case... [W]e
welcome the views of counsel in the unusual situation where failure to publish our opinion
may not be in the public interest."). Indeed, the language of the Second Circuit's no-
citation rule, Local Rule 0.23, is itself a tacit admission of the court's fallibility. Rule 0.23
cites as its raison d'etre the following: "Since [unpublished summary orders] do not
constitute formal opinions of the court and are unreported or not uniformly available to all
parties, they shall not be cited or otherwise used in unrelated cases .... Yet if summary
orders indeed added nothing to the law, then it would not matter if they were not uniformly
available to all parties.
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who should be authorized to determine which of their
decisions should be long remembered.76
The theoretical justification for no-citation rules-that they
pertain to points of law as clear as day versus night-is
manifestly in conflict with what our courts have been doing.
2. All Opinions Add to the Common Law and Have Persuasive
Value
As Chief Judge Holloway noted, "Each ruling, published
or unpublished, involves the facts of a particular case and the
application of law-to the case. Therefore all rulings of [the]
court are precedents."77 With each published opinion, future
litigants have less latitude in arguing the dissimilarity of their
own fact-patterns. That is, the sheer number of a particular type
of case may add weight to the principle for which the cases
stand. The very assumption upon which no-citation rules are
built-that there is a garbage dump of unimportant decisions-is
incorrect. Again, if it were correct, there would be no incentive
to cite them, and there would be no need for a rule to prohibit
citation.
Moreover, even in the unlikely event that a case's fact-
pattern is identical to that found in a previous opinion, a new,
citable opinion cannot be said to be bereft of any importance.
Not all "settled" points of law are equally unshakable.
Additional decisions, even if repetitive and obvious, add to the
depth and stability of the legal principles treated therein.78
3. Unpublished Decisions Are Historical Facts
Individually and in the aggregate, unpublished cases can
convey unique information about a court, about particular judges
and, most importantly, about the disposition of prior, similar
76. Justice John Paul Stevens, Address to the Illinois State Bar Association's
Centennial Dinner 9 (Jan. 22, 1977) (emphasis added).
77. Re Tenth Cir. Rules, 955 F.2d at 37 (Holloway, C.J., dissenting).
78. The Committee on Criminal Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York made this argument in 1983, when it issued a report criticizing the Second Circuit's
Rule 0.23, which prohibits citation to unpublished opinions. This report-which raises the
very constitutional issues addressed in by this article-is reprinted in 2 Bar Panels Ask
Change in Second Circuit Court Rule, 189 N.Y. L.J. I (May 20, 1983).
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cases. By outlawing even the mention of such cases, the courts
inflict on themselves an artificial amnesia that weakens the
richness and influence of their jurisprudence. It is undoubtedly
for these reasons that most jurists would be shocked if the
United States Supreme Court ever adopted a citation prohibition
that barred litigants from speaking about past rulings, even its
summary opinions. Such rules opted for by circuit courts of
appeals should invoke the same reaction." Citation prohibitions
do nothing less than prevent litigants and their counsel from
discussing pertinent facts before the branch of government most
intimately concerned with them. °
An unpublished opinion can serve as the best or only
written record of an appellate court's historical treatment of an
issue. It is ironic that a litigant remains free to cite to sources
ranging from foreign decisions to the Code of Hammurabi,"
which may have their own unique relevance in the proper
circumstance, yet is unable to inform an appellate court about its
own history. Similarly, no court would prohibit citation to the
published opinions of a sister circuit. Although not binding on
the parties at bar, those opinions can show trends in the common
law and authoritative approval of legal principles otherwise
unsettled locally.
79. Although the rulings of a federal appellate court, which must hear every appeal, do
not always carry the same gravitas as the rulings of the Supreme Court, which has the
discretion to hear only the most significant of cases, the opinions of both are important
public events and can be distinguished in this regard only by degree, not kind.
80. Another systematic problem with citation prohibitions exists: No-citation rules may
negatively affect the quality of judicial decisionmaking. See William L. Reynolds &
William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of
Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573, 598-626 (1981); Reynolds &
Richman, supra n. 8, at 1199-1204.
81. See e.g. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 n. 8 (1997) (stating that "in
almost every western democracy it is a crime to assist a suicide," and citing a Canadian
case that discusses assisted-suicide provisions in Austria, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and France).
82. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 333 n. 41 (1972) (citing the Code of
Hammurabi for historical perspective on retributive justice).
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C. On Balance, the Suppression of Discourse Concerning
Unpublished Case Law in the Course of Judicial Proceedings
Violates Petitioners' Rights under the First Amendment
The "social value" of the discussion of unpublished
opinions is great: Many of these opinions are unique windows
on the shifting boundaries of the common law. All unpublished
decisions have persuasive value and, as such, can add to the
rhetorical impact of a litigant's legal argument. And, perhaps
most important, all unpublished decisions are historical facts,
facts that may be relevant to a litigant's case. As discussed
above, the countervailing "social interest in order and
morality"83 served by citation prohibitions seems minor, at best.
Accordingly, it is unclear how no-citation rules can possibly be
thought justifiable when balanced against First Amendment
values and criteria.
Several objections to this conclusion can be imagined,
although they ultimately fail. First, it may be argued that no-
citation rules do not offend the First Amendment because one is
still free to discuss uncitable cases outside the courtroom.
However, as the United States Supreme Court has long held,
"[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised
in some other place."" And there is no more appropriate place
for the discussion of the holdings of a court than before that
court.
Nor can the government justify no-citation rules as proper
"time, place or manner" restrictions. Such regulations must be
implemented without regard to the content of the speech.85 A no-
83. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).
84. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S 147, 163 (1939); see also Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 411 n. 4 (1974) (per curiam) (noting that although prohibition's effect may
be minimal, a person "'is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place"')
(quoting Schneider, 308 U.S at 163).
85. See e.g. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (ordinance
banning "for sale" and "sold" signs for purpose of stemming flight of white homeowners
from racially integrated town invalidated; ordinance concerned with content of speech);
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Commn., 429 U.S. 167, 176 (1976)
(" [W]hen the board sits in public meetings to conduct public business and hear the views
of citizens, it may not be required to discriminate between speakers on the basis of their
employment, or the content of their speech.").
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citation rule directly and improperly targets the content of a
litigant's speech-the discussion of unpublished cases-and
thus cannot be justified as a proper "time, place or manner"
restriction.
Furthermore, there is no principled reason to distinguish the
courtroom as a forum for the expression of opinion from a more
traditional forum in which the First Amendment unquestionably
applies, like a soapbox in a public park. The audiences may be
different-that is, the general public as opposed to one judge or
a panel of judges-but the courtroom is a public forum.
A comparison of speech concerning trial proceedings and
the in-court discussion of unpublished cases is instructive. The
Supreme Court has held that the discussion of trial proceedings
is "of critical importance to our type of government in which the
citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public
business."86 Indeed, the trial plays such a central role to our
government that the First Amendment protects the right of
"[t]hose who see and hear what transpired [and allows those
persons to] report it with impunity."' The First Amendment
guarantees the press the ability to report trial proceedings with
impunity because only a well-informed citizenry can properly
fine-tune the mechanisms of democracy. The discussion of an
appeal and the resulting appellate opinion-the judiciary
branch's distilled summary of the trial and its discussion of a
federal district court judge's purported errors-should be as
unfettered before the judiciary as the proceedings of a trial in the
press. For all the abstract power invested in the citizenry to keep
the government working, on a more immediate level, it is the
courts that enforce individual rights, and the judiciary cannot
effectively protect those rights when the discussion before it is
subject to censure based on the content of the information. The
suppression of truthful facts about the court in the courtroom is
just as incompatible with our constitutional system as the
suppression of truthful facts about the court outside the
courtroom. 8
86. Cox, 420 U.S. at 495.
87. Id. at 492 (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (emphasis omitted)).
88. Nor can no-citation rules be defended as a means of regulating lawyer conduct. The
rules apply to citizens appearing pro se as well as to state-licensed lawyers. In any event,
the fact that lawyers enjoy the privilege of practicing law does not provide a constitutional
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While certainly not unfathomable, it is nonetheless
unsettling to witness how the judicial branch-which we count
on to preserve basic constitutional values on a daily basis-
could have so easily fallen victim to the same types of
bureaucratic pressures that often lead to misguided
decisionmaking, particularly given that their no-citation rules
conflict with the very charter the courts are entrusted to uphold.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS
First Amendment aside, commentators have sensed that
courts, in radically departing from the practice of allowing a
litigant to cite to all their past opinions, have stepped beyond
their rule-making authority. It is this unease that has led
commentators, and recently the panel in Anastasoff, to criticize
no-citation rules as improperly undermining the principle of
stare decisis and, by doing so, interfering with the separation of
powers.89 Although these criticisms, in the end, may not prove
persuasive, citation prohibitions do indeed interfere with the
separation of powers, not because they deny unpublished case
law any precedential value, but because the courts lack the
power under Article III to limit the substance of the non-
frivolous arguments that litigants choose to advance before
them.
A. Under Article III, the Power of Federal Courts to Engage in
Rulemaking Is Limited
Federal appellate courts cite two sources of authority to
promulgate local rules. Primarily, federal courts cite Title 28
section 2071 of the United States Code, which allows them to
"prescribe rules for the conduct of their business."90 Yet courts
basis for suppressing their speech in the prosecution of their clients' claims or defenses.
Newport, Ky. v. lacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 102 n. 6 (1986) ("Even 23 years ago it was 'too
late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the
denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."') (quoting Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
89. See supra nn. 33-36.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994) states, in relevant part:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from
time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be
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also invoke, independent of legislative authority, their "inherent
power" to regulate courtroom procedure.9 As will be shown
below, the former is subsumed within the scope of the latter, and
neither supplies the necessary authority for a no-citation rule.
Although federal courts have been invoking their inherent
power for two hundred years, this source of authority has been
described as "nebulous" ' 92  and its bounds as "shadowy."
' 93
consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed
under section 2072 of this title.
Section 2072 gives the United States Supreme Court "power to prescribe rules of practice
and procedure." 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a) (1994), which
applies to the district courts:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to
time, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment,
make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. A
local rule shall be consistent with-but not duplicative of-Acts of Congress
and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 [United States Supreme Court's
power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure] and 2075 [bankruptcy rules].
A local rule imposing a requirement of form shall not be enforced in a manner
that causes a party to lose rights because of a nonwillful failure to comply with
the requirement.
91. See Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 159 (1949) (" [T]he inherent power of courts to
punish contempts... is not open to question."); U.S. ex rel. Carapa v. Curran, 297 F. 946,
955 (2d Cir. 1924) ("The federal courts undoubtedly possess certain powers not
immediately derived from statute, but which necessarily result from their very nature");
see also 21 C.J.S. Courts § 126 (1990) ("While courts are very generally authorized by
constitutional or statutory provisions to make their own rules for the regulation of their
practice and procedure, it is also generally stated that courts have inherent or plenary
authority to make their own rules."); 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 43-45 (1995) (discussing
inherent powers of courts); Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 ABA
J. 599 (1926); but see Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking
Procedures, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 905, 929-30, 944-61 (1976) (rulemaking power of federal
courts is appropriately viewed as legislative delegation; addressing local rules).
92. See Robert E. Rodes et al., Sanctions Imposable for Violations of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 179 n. 466 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1981).
93. Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 Colum. L. Rev.
480, 485 (1958). As the Third Circuit has accurately recognized in Eash v. Riggins
Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc):
The conceptual and definitional problems regarding inherent power that have
bedeviled commentators for years stem from several factors. First, perhaps
because federal courts infrequently resort to their inherent powers or because
such reliance most often is not challenged, very few federal cases discuss in
detail the topic of inherent powers. More importantly, those cases that have
employed inherent power appear to use that generic term to describe several
distinguishable court powers. To compound this lack of specificity, courts have
relied occasionally on precedents involving one form of power to support the
court's use of another.
Id. at 561-62 (citing, inter alia, Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress
over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in
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Nonetheless, courts appear to invoke it in three discrete yet
related ways.
First, courts invoke their inherent authority to protect from
legislative encroachment judicial activities deemed indefeasibly
vested in the judicial branch.9 4 Such inherent authority is
grounded in the separation of powers.9 Thus, courts have relied
on this species of inherent power to void legislation requiring a
written opinion in every case; 96 to declare a hearing schedule; 97
to deny a court the power to issue its mandate until a prescribed
period of time after the judgment has elapsed, even if this
renders the judgment meaningless; 98 and to provide for the
automatic disqualification of judges simply upon the application
of a party. 99 However, because this brand of inherent authority is
never invoked to justify an affirmative court action such as the
promulgation of a local rule, it has no bearing on the propriety
of citation prohibitions.
Second, courts regularly invoke the term "inherent power"
to encompass those powers "necessary to the exercise of all
others."' Thus, courts invoke this second species of inherent
power to justify actions essential to the administration of
justice' °' oi functioning of the judiciary. '°2 Accordingly, this
species of authority "may be regulated within limits not
precisely defined," but "the attributes which inhere in that
power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor
Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1023 (1924); Tyrrell Williams, The Source
of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure, 22 Wash. U. L.Q. 459, 473-74
(1937)).
94. See Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-
Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 33 (1958).
95. Id. at 33; see also U.S. v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871).
96. Vaughan v. Harp, 4 S.W. 751 (Ark. 1887).
97. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Long, 251 P. 486 (Okla. 1926).
98. Burton v. Mayer, 118 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1938).
99. State ex rel. Bushman v. Vandenberg, 280 P.2d 344 (Or. 1955) (en banc).
100. E.g. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (the contempt
sanction is "[t]he most prominent" of the inherent powers) (quoting U.S. v. Hudson, I I
U.S. 32, 34 (1812)); see also Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303 (1888).
101. Michaelson v. U.S. ex rel. Chicago, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924) ("[T]he power to
punish for contempts is inherent in all courts .... It is essential to the administration of
justice.").
102. Levine v. U.S., 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960); see also Cooke v. U.S., 267 U.S. 517, 539
(1925) (attorney held in contempt for sending judge letter containing derogatory language
towards judge); Myers v. U.S., 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924).
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rendered practically inoperative."'O' Courts have frequently
relied on this second species of inherent power to impose
contempt sanctions, '°4 to "act sua sponte to dismiss a suit...
and enter [a] default judgment" for failure to prosecute a case,' °5
or, less frequently, "to file restrictive pre-filing orders against
vexatious litigants." 106
Third, courts have invoked their "inherent power" to
prescribe such rules of practice, pleading, and procedure "to
secure the just and prompt disposition of cases."'O0 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that this
species of inherent power is
rooted in the notion that a federal court, sitting in equity,
possesses all of the common law equity tools of a Chancery
Court (subject, of course, to congressional limitation) to
process litigation to ajust and equitable conclusion.
So, for example, the Supreme Court has held that a federal
court has the inherent power to appoint an auditor to aid in its
decisionmaking. 4 This third species of inherent power has also
103. Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66; see also Caniner v. U.S., 350 U.S. 399, 404 (1956);
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227-28 (1821) (congressional enactment of contempt
statute "can only be considered either as an instance of abundant caution, or a legislative
declaration, that the power of punishing for contempt shall not extend beyond its known
and acknowledged limits").
104. E.g. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 764 ("[A] judge must have and exercise [contempt
sanctions] in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the
authority and dignity of the court.") (quoting Cooke, 267 U.S. at 539) (internal citation
omitted); Levine, 362 U.S. at 615 (" [Tihe power to convict for criminal contempt has been
deemed an essential and inherent aspect of the very existence of our courts."); Fisher, 336
U.S. at 159 ("[Tihe inherent power of courts to punish contempts ... is essential to
preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from failing into
disrepute."); Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. at 289.
105. John's Insulation, Inc. v. L. Addison & Assoc., Inc., 156 F.3d 101 (Ist Cir. 1998)
(internal citations omitted).
106. Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999).
107. Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137, 141-42 (3d Cir. 1973); see also Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 314
(1920); Dabbs v. Cutler, 19 F.3d 18, 1994 WL 64671 (6th Cir. Mar. I, 1994).
108. ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978) (internal
citation omitted); cf Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 5 (1973) (federal courts possess "inherent
equitable power"); Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528, 531 (3d Cir. 1955) ("Our Federal
judiciary has consistently recognized that at common law this inherent power existed." ).
109. Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 314 (1920). Although the Peterson Court called
its invocation of this power "essential" to the disposition of the case, in actuality the
appointment of an auditor is merely helpful. Id. at 312; see Note, Compulsory Reference in
Actions at Law, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 324 (1921). The long-standing practice of the federal
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been invoked as authority to "elect to use" a state mechanism
for certification of a question of doubtful state law;' 0 to grant
bail in a situation not dealt with by statute;' to dismiss a suit
pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens;".2 to manage
its docket;".3 to stay proceedings;' 4 to consolidate actions;.'5 to
protect a nonparty from abusive discovery; ' and to justify the
adoption of court rules that are consistent with the policies of 28
U.S.C. § 2071-that is, those that prescribe the conduct of court
business."' It is well settled, however, that court rules
promulgated under a court's inherent power are subservient to
the supremacy of statutory or constitutional dictates."8
courts of making such appointment has been codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53
(1994) (providing for appointment of masters to aid jury). See Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 743 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1979).
110. Weaverv. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744, 747 (3d Cir. 1982).
111. Johnston, 227 F.2d at 528, 531; see also Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903);
In re Gannon, 27 F.2d 362, 363 (E.D. Pa. 1928).
112. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 502, 507 (1947).
113. Sherman v. U.S., 801 F.2d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1986).
114. In reNLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1993).
115. U.S. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 221 F.2d 698, 702 (6th Cir. 1955).
116. Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., 894 F.2d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
117. See Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Rhode Island, 53 F.3d 1349, 1353,
1362 (1st Cir. 1995) (local rule requiring prosecutors to obtain judicial approval before
serving subpoena on attorney to compel evidence concerning client a proper exercise of 28
U.S.C. § 2071 and inherent authority); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752
F.2d 16, 17, 20 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1984) (court rule prohibiting presence of television cameras in
courtroom a proper exercise of 28 U.S.C. § 2071 authority and inherent power to regulate
courtroom); In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1037-38 (2d Cir. 1976) (court rule providing for
sanctions against counsel, as opposed to client, was properly promulgated under authority
of 28 U.S.C. § 2071 and inherent power to "manage[] the court's business"); Franquez v.
Palomo, 604 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1979) ("In the absence of procedural rules
specifically covering a situation, the court may, pursuant to its inherent power and Rule 83
decision-making power, fashion a rule not inconsistent with the Federal Rules") (internal
citation omitted).
118. See Carlisle v. U.S., 517 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1996) (holding that district court did not
have authority to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal; federal courts "may,
within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the
Congress. Whatever the scope of this 'inherent power,' however, it does not include the
power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure"); Bank of Nova Scotia v. U.S., 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) ("[A] federal court
may not invoke supervisory power to circumvent the harmless-error inquiry prescribed by
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure .... In the exercise of its supervisory authority, a
federal court 'may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by
the Constitution or Congress.' Nevertheless, it is well established that '[e]ven a sensible
and efficient use of the supervisory power... is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or
statutory provisions."') (internal citations omitted); State v. Pavelich, 279 P. 1102 (Wash.
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B. Citation Prohibitions Are Non-Essential to the
Administration of Justice, Are Substantive in Character, and Are
Promulgated Ultra Vires
Applying the foregoing framework to the issue of no-
citation rules, the key questions appear to be whether such
prohibitions are necessary to the exercise of the judicial power,
or are rules of practice, pleading, or procedure that secure the
just and prompt disposition of cases. We submit that citation
prohibitions do neither.
1. Citation Prohibitions Are Not Necessary
Citation prohibitions clearly are not necessary to the
exercise of the judicial function. Whatever might be assumed
about the possible benefits of no-citation rules, they cannot
reasonably be viewed as necessary to the court's basic ability to
function. They bear no reasonable relationship, for example, to
court rules allowing the imposition of sanctions to maintain
order or to dismiss cases for non-prosecution. These and other
such rules may be justified as essential to the functioning of a
workable judicial system. For this reason, rules that fall into this
category are deemed so vital and important that, in the words of
the Supreme Court, they can "neither be abrogated nor rendered
practically inoperative" by the legislature." 9
Rules prohibiting citation to unpublished cases seem
manifestly of an altogether different character. As discussed
above, even if one assumes the legitimacy and necessity of
nonpublication rules, which is a fair assumption, citation
prohibitions are not necessary to give effect to these rules. Of
the three justifications for citation prohibitions-that they are
necessary to effect nonpublication rules, that citation of
unpublished decisions must be stifled to prevent
misinterpretation, and that otherwise resource-strapped lawyers
would be disadvantaged-only one has potential merit, and only
in theory at that. All things being equal, citation prohibitions, in
1929) (court may exercise its inherent power to regulate practice and procedure but not
substantive rules).
119. Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 799 (1987) (quoting Michaelson, 266
U.S. at 66).
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limited circumstances, may save counsel and the court time
otherwise spent reviewing unimportant cases. That such a
benefit can be hypothesized, however, can hardly be viewed as
establishing the necessity of such rules to allow the judicial
system to function. Courts retain the ability to sanction lawyers
for frivolous conduct, including, in an extreme case, the abusive
citation of irrelevant decisions. Five circuits have for years
allowed citation to unpublished opinions where there is no better
precedent available, and these courts do not appear to have
suffered for the practice. 120
2. Citation Prohibitions Are Substantive, Not Procedural
Courts have the power to prescribe rules of practice,
pleading, and procedure to secure the just and prompt
disposition of cases. A proper exercise of the court's inherent
power here does not affect the outcome of a case; rather, it
affects collateral aspects of the case such as the location, speed,
or cost of the case. So, for example, judicial preference for 14-
point type over 12-point type, rules regulating the form and the
length of briefs and argument, rules requiring pre-argument
mediation, or even a forum non conveniens dismissal in the
name of efficiency and economy, are proper exercises of
inherent authority because they do not materially affect the
outcome of a case.
The Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. Winn121 is
illustrative of the limits of this inherent power. In Winn, the
plaintiff had sued in federal circuit court to eject defendant from
certain property and had attempted to offer into evidence a state-
certified copy of the relevant land grant or patent. The circuit
court, however, excluded the copy from evidence because it was
not an original.' The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court
reversed. The Court found that under the common law and the
law of Georgia, "exemplification under the great seal of the
state, was, per se, evidence," 123 and the court below had no
authority to alter that rule. It held:
120. See supra n. 58.
121. 30 U.S. 233 (1831).
122. Id. at 239-40.
123. Id. at 2 4 1.
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However convenient the rule might be to regulate the
general practice of the courts, we think, that it could not
control the rights of the parties in matters of evidence,
admissible by the general principles of law.124
In this inherent-authority context-as opposed to the
unrelated contexts in which a substance-procedure dichotomy is
made, as in the Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins"' choice-
of-law context or the retroactivity context-" matters of
evidence" are substantive.' 6 That is, evidentiary rules are not
primarily designed to secure the just and prompt disposition of a
case; rather, they affect the substantive outcome by affecting the
substance of the argument before the court.
In this context, it is difficult to articulate a principled
distinction between citation prohibitions and rules of evidence.
The latter affects what facts may be introduced to the trier of
fact. If an evidentiary rule keeps a document out of evidence, the
power of the proponent of its admission to persuade the court
has been diminished and there is a chance, sometimes marginal
and sometimes material, that the outcome of the case will be
affected. Thus, the rules of evidence are substantive and must be
promulgated by Congress, not by the courts.
Citation prohibitions affect what precedents may be cited
on questions of law. As shown above, an unpublished opinion,
even if denied its precedential value, can be highly relevant to a
case in numerous ways-especially if the unpublished decision
addresses an issue of first impression, as in the Anastasoff case
and other cases noted earlier. To be denied the ability to cite to
124. Id. at 243 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Emerson Elec. Co. v. Davoil, Inc., 88
F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the Federal Circuit found that a district court does not have
inherent power to order patentee to file, in a patent reexamination proceeding, papers
prepared by alleged infringer.
125. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Specifically, in characterizing a local rule as substantive rather
than procedural, particular care must be taken to tease apart the various lines of cases
purporting to make a substantive-procedural distinction. Courts most commonly draw the
substantive-procedural line in choice-of-law cases and in retroactivity cases. The
characterization of an issue as procedural for one of these purposes, however, cannot be so
easily transplanted into a separation of powers context. As the Supreme Court has warned,
"The line between 'substance' and 'procedure' shifts as the legal context changes. 'Each
implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used."'
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (citations omitted); see also Boyd Rosene &
Assoc., Inc. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1999).
126. See State v. Pavelich, 279 P. 1102, 1103 (Wash. 1929) ("Rules of evidence
constitute substantive law, and cannot be governed by rules of court.").
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such cases diminishes a litigant's ability to advocate no less than
a rule limiting what facts the litigant may introduce into
evidence. Instead of promoting the fair or prompt disposition of
cases, as a proper exercise of the court's inherent authority does,
citation prohibitions have an undeniable capacity to affect the
outcome of a case by limiting a litigant's ability to discuss a
whole class of judicial decisions. Accordingly, no-citation rules,
like rules of evidence, are substantive and must be promulgated,
if at all, by Congress, not by the courts.
The Supreme Court has presciently cautioned that the
federal courts' "inherent powers must be exercised with
restraint and discretion" due to their potency. 12 In this instance,
the courts have not exercised due restraint and discretion, as no-
citation rules fall outside the ambit of a court's inherent powers
under Article III.
V. CONCLUSION
It must be frankly conceded that for many and perhaps
most unpublished opinions, their absence from the body of
published case law has wrought no great social harm. Yet this is
no different from most trials; almost any given page of trial
transcript will be filled with nothing that screams for publication
in the name of a better judiciary or a more informed public. Just
as the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the public's
right to publicize the details of any given day of trial, the rights
of litigants and counsel to discuss unpublished decisions in court
should be no less protected. Whether it is because the federal
appellate courts have blinded themselves from hundreds of
snapshots from their own history in violation of the First
Amendment, or whether it is because they have promulgated
rules that interfere with the just disposition of individual cases in
contradiction of Article III, the harm wrought by citation
prohibitions is tangible. As the circuits become more
comfortable with this practice, this harm will only multiply.
127. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991).

